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We investigate whether political institutions can promote attachment to the state in multiethnicsocieties. Building on literatures on nationalism, democratization, and conflict resolution, wediscuss the importance of attachment, understood as a psychological identification with, and
pride in, the state. We construct a model of state attachment, specifying the individual-, group-, and
state-level conditions that foster it. Then, using cross-national survey data from 51 multiethnic states, we
show that, in general, ethnic minorities manifest less attachment to the states in which they reside than
do majorities. Combining the survey data with minority group attributes and country-level attributes,
we show that the attachment of minorities varies importantly across groups and countries. Our central
finding is that federalism and proportional electoral systems—–two highly touted solutions to ethnic
divisions—–have at best mixed effects. These results have implications for state-building and democratic
consolidation in ethnically heterogeneous states.
In early January 2004, a group of Iraqi lawyers andforeign advisors convened in Baghdad to contem-plate the institutional future of a new Iraq. They
were charged with setting down some basic princi-
ples that would underlie the Transitory Administrative
Law, which would likely (and, in fact, did) inform the
Iraqi constitution of 2005. Their principal goal was to
maintain a unified state despite potentially destabiliz-
ing ethnic divisions. Guided by their own experience
and strong theory, the consultants prescribed feder-
alism and a proportional electoral system (Diamond
2005, 163, 268)—–power-sharing institutions thought to
ameliorate ethnic divisions and foster loyalty to the
state.
The Iraqi case exemplifies a paradox regarding
democracies and state allegiance. On the one hand, ef-
fective democracy depends on widespread attachment
to the state. Pockets of disenchantment and disloyalty
can lead to distortions in participation and representa-
tion at best and violent rejection of the state at worst.
On the other hand, democratic states are likely both
more susceptible to such threats and less equipped to
cope with them. Although authoritarian governments
can rely on fear and force to manufacture allegiance to
the state, democracies must foster allegiance without
infringing on civil liberties, the very liberties that allow
groups to promote their identities and agendas. John
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Stuart Mill anticipated this problem long ago, asserting
that “the boundaries of [representative] governments
should coincide in themain with those of nationalities”
(Mill 1861). For Mill, who was writing in the era of
state formation, the idea of redrawing state boundaries
was more than just a thought experiment. For leaders
of multiethnic states faced with relatively entrenched
borders, the challenge is to deepen democracy while
mitigating disaffection for the state.
Institutions are an obvious resource for leaders
because they are at least somewhat malleable. For
example, as in Iraq, a window of opportunity to de-
sign institutional solutions arises during the constitu-
tional drafting exercises—–the “hour of the lawyers”
(Dahrendorf 1990, 3)—–that often accompany transi-
tions to democracy. The major institutional solutions
proposed both in Iraq and in the extensive literature
on “plural” or “divided” societies are federalism and
proportional representation. According to their pro-
ponents, these consensual institutions successfully ac-
commodate dissidents and encourage state unity (e.g.,
Lijphart 1999). This view, however intuitive, is notwith-
out its critics. Skeptics argue that these same institu-
tions are ineffectual and may even exacerbate state
disintegration (e.g., Nordlinger 1972; Norris 2004).
Rabushka andShepsle (1972, 217) put it bluntly: “ . . . is
the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in
the plural society manageable in a democratic frame-
work? We think not.”
At root is a theoretical puzzle regarding the effects
of power-sharing. Institutional solutions such as fed-
eralism and proportional electoral systems disperse
power to groups by delegating authority or by facil-
itating their representation in government. But does
distributing power to those with loyalties outside of
the state strengthen or weaken their commitment to
the state? Empowering groups could ameliorate their
discontent but it could also reinforce group identities
while providing resources that groups can then use to
bringmore pressure on the state. This contradictory set
of effects parallels the effect of democratization more
generally because democratization also empowers pre-
viously unrepresented groups.
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Evidence of the effects of consensual institutions
is inconclusive. We simply do not know whether mi-
norities in states with democratic or, more specifically,
consensual institutions are more or less attached to the
state. This creates a conundrum for leaders in both new
democracies and some established democracies, who
are eager for workable prescriptions for state harmony.
Our principal goals are to shed light on the magnitude
of disaffectionwith the state and to adjudicate between
competing views about how well political institutions
mitigate disaffection.
THE PARADOX OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
Effective democracy depends on allegiance to the state,
but the democratic state is not always good at com-
manding such loyalty. The first half of this paradox
deserves emphasis, for it is not always prominent in the-
ories of democratic consolidation. As Linz and Stepan
(1996) note, much influential work on both national-
ism (e.g., Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991) and on de-
mocratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) ignores
the connection between democratization and national
unity. However, democratization arguably depends on
national unity, in that constituent groups must agree
on the need for and desirability of the collective as
a precondition for open participation and competi-
tion among such groups. Rustow (1970) identifies state
unity as the only requirement for successful democratic
transition. Dahl (1989, 207) agrees, noting that “the cri-
teria of the democratic process presuppose the rightful-
ness of the unit itself.” Linz and Stepan (1996, 18) argue
that there are “severe (andwe believe insurmountable)
limits to democracy unless the territorial entity is rec-
ognized as a sovereign state.” Indeed, compared to the
act of defining the legitimate boundaries of state power,
ensuring the quality and performance of democracy is
less important. Though acceptance of democracy as
“the only game in town” (Di Palma 1990) and the con-
tinued loyalty of electoral losers (Przeworski 1991) are
crucial to democratic consolidation, even more funda-
mental is an acceptance of the state itself as the rightful
arbiter of citizens’ affairs (by whatever rules). If the
state is not the “only state in town,” then questions
of support for democracy or the political system are
irrelevant.
Even though democracy depends on allegiance to
the state, the transition to democracy likely endangers
any such allegiance, at least at first. In transitioning
democracies, newfound rights and liberties may em-
power groups that compete with the state for loyalty,
allowing group leaders to center their appeals on group
interests and identities. Aspiring group leaders may
actually have an incentive to seek the allegiance of
fellow group members by politicizing their group’s
identity (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). This creates
open political competition among groups (qua polit-
ical parties) for the power to distribute state resources.
Free and fair elections—–the hallmark of democratic
governance—–will then accentuate ethnic group iden-
tities, especially if each of the candidates or parties
represents a single group and centers its appeals on
ethnic grievances. Thus, democratization can have a
destabilizing impact in the short run (see Posen 1993;
Snyder 2000).
If democracy does inculcate attachment to the state,
it is likely to do so only in the long run. As democracies
persist over time, individual political and civil liber-
ties, as well as electoral actors and procedures, become
institutionalized. Moreover, as Anderson et al. (2005)
argue, a type of learning process takes place for citi-
zens and especially forminorities, who observe that the
political system protects these liberties and that there
will be future opportunities to seek power. Democracy
will engender more certainty regarding participatory
channels, if not outcomes. This “predictable process”
creates loyalty even among electoral losers (see also
Przeworski 1991). Though long-standing democracies
are not necessarily devoid of disaffection, a longer his-
tory of democracy should create greater attachment to
the state among its constituent groups. In the empirical
analysis that follows, we investigate both the short- and
the long-term effects of democracy.
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR DISUNITY
WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
Of course, political leaders cannot necessarily wait for
the potential long-term effects of democracy to take
hold. Their goal is to design specific democratic in-
stitutions to mitigate disaffection with the state dur-
ing their lifetimes. The most prominent institutional
remedies for disaffection with the state involve coun-
tering the majoritarian elements of democracy with
more consensual modes of decision making. These
remedies center on two principal arenas of reform:
the way representatives are selected (the electoral
system) and the relative autonomy of subnational
units (federalism versus unitary government). How-
ever, there is no agreement—–either theoretically or
empirically—–that either type of reform actually builds
unity within the state. Indeed, these power-sharing “so-
lutions” imply two equally plausible, but opposing,
consequences: sharing power with ethnic minorities
could either ease their discontent or allow it room to
grow.
The harmonizing effect of electoral systems is per-
haps most associated with Arend Lijphart’s consoci-
ationalism (e.g., Lijphart 1999; see also Nordlinger
1972). In his view, majoritarian systems often deny
minorities access to power, thereby reducing their
affinity for the state. Lijphart advocates a propor-
tional electoral system that maximizes minority rep-
resentation while also providing elites an opportunity
to form cross-ethnic coalitions. The potential prob-
lem with proportional representation is that, absent
any cross-ethnic coalition, it may only solidify eth-
nic identities and exacerbate ethnic conflict. Horowitz
(1985, 2002) argues that successful electoral systems
must create incentives for cross-ethnic coalitions be-
fore the election and advocates preferential voting, in
which politicians compete for “second-choice” votes
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and thereby must appeal to citizens outside their own
ethnic group (see also Reilly 2001). We leave aside
any discussion or test of such alternatives, which are
not widely practiced, and focus on the merits of pro-
portionality. Evidence that the proportionality of elec-
toral outcomes increases minority attachment to the
state is mixed. Proportional systems are associated
with less ethnic protest and rebellion (Cohen 1997;
Lijphart 1999; Saideman et al. 2002), but not with
attitudinal measures of system support among ethnic
minorities (Norris 2004).
The second institutional solution, federalism, entails
devolving power to sub-state units. By providing a de-
gree of autonomy to units wherein national minori-
ties might be majorities, federalism conceivably shifts
power tominorities and therebymakes themmore con-
tent to live within the state (see Lijphart 1999; Riker
1964; Stepan 1999). However, federalism’s impact on
attitudes towards the state is also uncertain. Lipset
(1981, 77) argues that democracies function best when
citizens have “a number of crosscutting, politically rel-
evant affiliations,” and a federal structure that divides
the state along ethnic lines may hinder the develop-
ment of such affiliations.Moreover, devolving power to
subunits may only provide ethnic leaders with “re-
sources that can be mobilized for nationalist ends”
and may also “encourage people to think and act ac-
cording to national categories” (Hechter 2000, 141).
Some cross-national evidence suggests that federal-
ism tends to decrease outright rebellion but increase
protest activity among minorities (e.g., Hechter 2000;
Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004). Case studies
of federal arrangements suggest that it has no consis-
tent effect on phenomena related to state attachment
(Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; Forsyth 1989).
Ultimately, there is no definitive evidence that either
proportional electoral systems or federalism remedy
divisions within plural societies. Kymlicka (1996: 130)
provides a fitting summary: “What then are the possible
sources of unity in a multination state which affirms,
rather than denies, its national differences? I do not
have a clear answer to this question.” These inconclu-
sive results may arise because the effect of institutional
solutions on the state attachment of ethnic groups de-
pends on other factors, especially on the characteristics
of the groups themselves. In other words, state attach-
ment derives from the interaction between political
institutions and group attributes.
We investigate two possible interactions. First, are
federalism’s effects intensifiedwhenaminority group is
geographically concentrated? Devolving power to ter-
ritorial unitsmayassuageminorities onlywhen they are
clustered enough to take advantage of such power (see
Hechter 2000; Saideman et al. 2002). But again the op-
posite is also possible: perhaps devolving power to geo-
graphically concentratedminorities makes them desire
autonomy all the more. Alternatively, there may be no
significant interaction: Horowitz (1985, 618) notes that
federalism can have a palliative effect even when eth-
nic groups are geographically dispersed. Estimating an
interaction between federalism and concentration will
help adjudicate between these expectations.
Second, do the effects of electoral proportionality
depend on the presence of an ethnically based party?
Proportionality may not be relevant to a group if it
lacks the means to gain representation in the legisla-
ture. The presence of an ethnically based party, there-
fore, is likely to augment any effect—–either divisive or
unifying—–of proportional electoral systems. Propor-
tional institutions could reduce minority disaffection
when a political party is clearly identifiedwith a group’s
interests and/or identity, since proportionality would
enhance the chances that this party would obtain seats
in the legislature.However, the combination of propor-
tionality and an ethnic party could only encourage this
party to center its campaign on ethnic appeals, which
might accentuate ethnic identities at the expense of
attachment to the state.
IDENTIFYING DISAFFECTION
AND DISUNITY
Indicators of State Attachment
Investigating citizens’ feelings towards the state neces-
sitates measuring attachment to the state and identify-
ing the groups whose attachment is in question. One
indicator of a group’s weak attachment to the state
is its participation in violence and protest. Although
such incidents signify disaffection in a dramatic fash-
ion, they are not reliable indicators of state unity for
three reasons. First, violence is episodic and arguably
rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996); disaffection of a lesser
degree, though it commands relatively little attention,
is more common. Second, violence may not be a polit-
ical statement if its perpetrators are interested only in
what they can steal, not in protesting state sovereignty
(see Collier andHoeffler 2004). Finally, those engaging
in violence may not represent the sentiment of their
group. For example, despite years of violence by the
Basque separatist group ETA, a large proportion of
Basques profess attachment to both the Basque region
and Spain (Dekker, Malova´, and Hoogendorn 2003;
Linz and Stepan 1992).
Instead of focusing on behavioral manifestations of
state disunity, we examine attitudinal manifestations
using survey data, something few comparative studies
have done (Silver andDowley 2000 andNorris 2004 are
notable exceptions). This approach addresses several
of the problems identified previously. First, survey data
canmeasure discontent with the state before it is mani-
fest in demonstrations. Survey-based measures of state
attachment do not necessarily predict future protest or
violence, but they may signal its potential. Barnes and
Kaase (1979) note that attitudes provide important pre-
conditions for political participation, and in particular
unconventional forms of participation, though other
factors, such as mobilization efforts and particular op-
portunity structures, are necessary to trigger episodes
of behaviors such as protest. Second, surveys have the
ability to reach a wide cross-section of minority group
members. These “rank-and-file” group members may
differ from activists who are more visible to outside
observers.
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In diagnosing state disunity, the operative concept is
people’s attachment to the state.We conceive of attach-
ment as involving two dimensions: self-categorization
as a member of that state and a positive affect for the
state. The question is whether citizens define them-
selves, at least in part, as members of the state, and
how warmly citizens feel towards the state. This con-
ceptualization parallels other conceptions of identity
(e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2000).1 Thus, a weak state at-
tachment exists if individuals do not self-categorize as
part of a state and/or if their feelings toward the state
are negative.
Although several cross-national datasets include
measures of state attachment, we prefer a dataset that
maximizes variation among countries in their politi-
cal institutions, economic development, and the na-
ture and history of their resident minority groups.
For these purposes, the World Values Survey (WVS)
has no equal. The most recent wave, conducted
from 1999 to 2001, included samples in 78 countries
(Inglehart et al. 2004).2 Moreover, the countries in the
WVS are more diverse than the mostly established
democracies in surveys such as the Eurobarometer.
The breadth of theWVS is valuable because challenges
to state unity exist in the developing world.
Within the WVS, two items capture the dimen-
sions of state attachment. The first captures self-
categorization: it asks respondents “which of the fol-
lowing best describes you?” and then gives descriptions
that correspond to different ethnic groups (e.g., “I am
white”), to the state (“I am American”), or to both
(“I am both white and American”). The specific de-
scriptions varied, but in each country respondents were
allowed to self-categorize as part of the state and/or to
choose a “substate” identification.3 The second item
gauges respondents’ affect toward the state by ascer-
taining their level of pride: “How proud are you to
be [state’s nationality]?” There are four response cate-
1 Our conceptualization of state attachment elides distinctions be-
tween variants such as “patriotism” and “nationalism” (e.g., de
Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). These distinctions can be important,
but here we are concerned with general attachment to the state.
2 The WVS contains three regions that are not sovereign states:
Puerto Rico, Northern Ireland, and (until recently) Montenegro. We
deleted the Puerto Rico sample from the analysis, combined the
Northern Ireland sample with the sample from Great Britain, and
combined the Montenegro sample with the sample from Serbia, re-
weighting the British and Serbian samples as discussed below.
3 Three comments about this measure are in order. First, it was
not included in 12 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, the
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Serbia and Montenegro.
Second, in 13 countries, respondents could choose among options
that corresponded to each of the three categories. In 7 countries,
there was no “ethnic only” option. In 19 countries, there was no
“dual” identity option (ethnic and state). Below we discuss the chal-
lenges this presents. Third, in several countries, the identification
item included a category for a religious identification in addition to
state identification. In Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,
Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan, respondents could choose
“Muslim”; in Israel they could choose “Jewish.” Substantial fractions
of respondents in each country did so. We excluded these cases from
all analyses. Respondents who selected a religious identification are
identifying neither with the state, nor, in these countries, with any
kind of minority ethnic group.
gories: “not at all proud,” “not very proud,” “somewhat
proud,” and “quite proud.”We refer to these measures
as “identification” and “pride,” respectively. Ideally we
could draw on multiple measures of each dimension,
as is advisable in cross-cultural survey analysis (see
Smith 2003). However, we believe the merits of the
World Values Survey—–namely, its extensive coverage
of countries—–outweigh the potential demerits of rela-
tively few measures of state attachment.
Identifying Ethnic Groups
Our focus here—–as in much of the literature on state-
building in multiethnic societies—–is on state attach-
ment among ethnic groups. To identify relevant eth-
nic groups, we draw on the Minorities at Risk (MAR)
project. Gurr (1993, 3) defines “minorities-at-risk” as
“communal groups” whose “core members share a
distinctive and enduring collective identity based on
cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and
to others with whom they interact.” These groups are
identified by two criteria: they have suffered from some
form of discrimination vis-a`-vis other groups in the
state; and they have been the focus of political mobi-
lization at some point between 1945 and 1989. Recent
updates of the MAR project through 2003 have identi-
fied almost 300 minorities-at-risk in over 100 countries.
(We use “communal group” and “minority-at-risk” in-
terchangeably, and “majority” to denote all other citi-
zens.)
Communal groups are ideal for our study for several
reasons. First, these groups are, in theory, those who
would plausibly challenge the state. Gurr (1993) docu-
ments rising protest and rebellion among these groups
from 1945 to 1989. By examining these groups, we are
thus constructing strong tests for the ameliorative ef-
fects of institutions. Second, these groups vary on im-
portant dimensions, including their history, geograph-
ical concentration, and the depth of their grievances
with the state. Because the MAR dataset provides in-
dicators of these and other dimensions, we can identify
the attributes of groups that exacerbate their disaf-
fection towards the state. Finally, we can determine
whether group attributes condition the effects of insti-
tutional arrangements.4
To sort survey respondents into the appropriate com-
munal group or into the “majority” group for each
country, we identified the communal group(s) in each
of the countries in the WVS. Then, using the ap-
propriate individual-level WVS variables—–ethnicity,
religion, language, region, or some combination
4 Hug (2003) argues that the MAR data suffer from selection bias
because they include only groups that have suffered discrimination
or taken political action. We agree and thus do not claim to pos-
sess data on every aggrieved minority; indeed, our analysis does not
even encompass every minority-at-risk. Nonetheless, minorities-at-
risk are not a monolithic set of groups bent on state destruction. For
example, blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans in the United States
are all classified as MARs. Given the relatively inclusive definition
of the MAR conceptualization and the accompanying set of group-
level attributes, we feel that the benefits of the MAR data exceed
their shortcomings.
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thereof—–we attempted to code individuals asmembers
or non-members of these groups. For many groups,
this process was straightforward—–for example, mem-
bers of the one communal group in Northern Ireland,
Catholics, could be identified using the religion vari-
able. For others, the availableWVSmeasures identified
group members imprecisely—–for example, in Egypt,
we considered respondents to be Copts when they
identified as Christian. In some cases, there was no
way to identify members of a communal group, either
because the relevant variable(s) did not exist in that
country’s survey or because the variable’s categories
did not clearly identify the group. For example, al-
though the Roma are classified as a communal group
in many European countries, only rarely did the WVS
include a designation for Roma (e.g., in the ethnicity
variable). In other cases, we could create a plausible
means to identify group members, but none turned up
in the sample.
Sample
Combining theMARandWVSdataproduces adataset
of 51 countries for which we can identify one or more
communal groups.Descriptive informationabout these
countries and groups is provided in the online appen-
dices. The countries derive from the third (1994–1997)
or fourth (1999–2001) wave of the WVS, depending
on the availability of data and key variables. By fo-
cusing on these 51 countries, we exclude 27 countries
from theWVS because either there were no communal
groups identified by the MAR Project, or we could
not locate any communal group members in the WVS
sample.5 We also excluded two countries, China and
Vietnam, that do not have competitive elections and,
thus, where attributes such as electoral proportionality
have little meaning.6 Though the resulting sample of
countries by no means includes every country where
disaffection with the state may exist, it nevertheless
extends the scope of existing survey-based studies (e.g.,
Norris 2004). The sample size in these 51 countries is
84,691 respondents, though the identification measure
is available for only 39 countries, as discussed earlier.
The 51 countries in our sample contain a total of 155
5 Sixteen countries do not contain any minorities-at-risk: Armenia,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden,
andUruguay. Nine countries containminorities-at-risk that we could
not locate in theWVS: CzechRepublic, El Salvador, France, Greece,
Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Slovakia, and Tanzania. In most of the
latter cases, there was no variable in the country’s survey that would
have allowed us to locate these groups. In two cases, Muslims in
France andGreece, there was a religion variable, but no respondents
were coded as Muslim.
6 Our criterion for categorizing elections in China and Vietnam as
non-competitive was these states’ overall level of political competi-
tion, as measured by the variable “polcomp” in the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2004). This measure incorporates infor-
mation about the regulation and competitiveness of participation.
China and Vietnam had the minimum value of this variable. Below
we report the results excluding countries that had higher, though still
low, levels of political competition. In both countries’ WVS samples,
there were fewminorities-at-risk (4HuiMuslims in China; 6 Chinese
and 10 Montagnards in Vietnam).
TABLE 1. Bivariate Relationship between
Minority Status and State Attachment
Minority- Entire
at-Risk Majority Sample
Identification
State only 32% 61% 55%
State and ethnicity 31 21 23
Ethnicity only 34 13 17
Don’t know or 3 6 5
no answer
Pride
Very proud 42% 61% 59%
Somewhat proud 29 27 26
Not very proud 13 8 8
Not at all proud 6 2 3
Don’t know or 10 3 4
no answer
Note: Cell entries are weighted percentages. For identity tabu-
lation, N = 58,324 and N(countries) = 39. For pride tabulation,
N = 84,691 and N(countries) = 51.
minorities-at-risk. Using the WVS data, we were able
to identify members of 90 of these groups, who number
15,761 in the pooled WVS country samples, leaving
68,930 “majority” citizens.7 Because the population of
many MAR groups is small, the WVS country samples
at times contain few group members, although the av-
erage group size across these 90 groups is reasonably
large (median= 104). Thus, although in some cases we
have large samples ofmembers of particular communal
groups, it would be inappropriate to generate point
estimates from the WVS sample for each individual
group. However, the modeling approach we employ
pools these groups together, thereby allowing us to
estimate average effects across a large sample.
State Attachment Cross-Nationally
Table 1 presents a cross-tabulation of both measures
of attachment with a dummy variable that indicates
minority-at-risk status. Two findings emerge. First, mi-
norities manifest high levels of state attachment. Sixty-
three percent of minorities identify either with the
state exclusively or with both the state and their ethnic
group. About one third (34%) identify only with their
ethnic group. Similarly, 71% say they are somewhat
or very proud of their state. Second, although their
level of state attachment is high, minorities manifest
lower levels than majorities. Only 13% of majorities
7 In the online appendices, we discuss the representativeness of these
90 groups vis-a`-vis the groups we could not identify and the universe
of MARs generally. We also discuss the correspondence between
each group’s proportion of the relevant WVS country sample and its
proportion of the country’s population. Where available, we use the
WVS design weights to account for any deviations between sample
and population characteristics, with two further adjustments. First,
because we combine the samples from Northern Ireland and Great
Britain and from Serbia and Montenegro, we weight these samples
according to their true fraction of the population (e.g., Northern Ire-
land’s fraction of the United Kingdom’s population). Second, when
analyzing the pooled sample of majorities and minorities, we weight
each country equally despite differences in sample size (see also
Silver and Dowley 2000).
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FIGURE 1. Scatterplot of State Attachment among Minority and Majority Populations
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A. Proportion Very Proud
Source: World Values Survey. Underlined country names indicate a sample size of minorities-at-risk of fewer than 25.
identify exclusively with their ethnic group, and 88%
are somewhat or very proud of their state. This differ-
ence in pride may even be underestimated, as there
are higher levels of non-response among minorities
than majorities (10% vs. 3%), which could mean that
minorities are essentially saying “this identity does not
apply tome” or else are reluctant to reveal lower levels
of pride in their state.
We also examined the relationship between identifi-
cation and pride (data not shown). Among majorities,
the proportion somewhat or very proud among those
who identified as “ethnic only” (87%) is not appre-
ciably different from the proportion among those who
identified as “state only” (90%). By contrast, among
minorities, pride was lower (60%) among those who
said “ethnic only” than it was among those who iden-
tified with both their ethnic group and the state (81%)
or with the state only (86%). Notably, minorities who
possess a dual state-ethnic identity are only slightly
less proud than those with exclusively a state identity.
This suggests a crucial fact: minorities do not need to
relinquish their ethnic identity to feel positively toward
the state.
To determine whether these differences between
minorities and majorities emerge consistently across
countries, we computed the proportion who said “very
proud” and the proportion who identified only with
the state, both for all communal group members in
each state and for all majorities. For the moment, we
treat individual communal groups within each state
as a collective, comparing them to “majority” respon-
dents. Figure 1 plots the average state attachment of
minorities against majorities, with separate panels for
pride and identification as well as a 45-degree line that
indicates equal levels of attachment in both groups.
In both panels, the data points lie mostly above the
reference line, indicating greater levels of attachment
among majorities than among minorities-at-risk. How-
ever, the size of this “gap” varies considerably; some
points are close to the line while others are far from
it. This variation confirms the need to investigate the
group- and country-level attributes that affect the state
attachment of minorities.8
A MODEL OF STATE ATTACHMENT
What factors influence an individual’s level of attach-
ment to the state? And, which factors, especially insti-
tutions, generate state attachment particularly among
minorities-at-risk? Estimating the precise effect of in-
stitutions on state unity requires that we specify as best
as possible the individual-, group-, and state-level vari-
ables that predict the state attachment ofmajorities and
minorities. We focus below on the primary hypotheses
and measures (see the online appendices for details
about all measures).
Individual-Level Factors
At the individual-level, our primary expectation is
that, on average, minorities-at-risk will report less at-
tachment to the state (e.g., Dowley and Silver 2000;
Sidanius et al. 1997), but the observed differences
8 The average level of pride and identification among each of the
90 minority groups is only weakly correlated with the measures of
“rebellion” and “protest” in theMinorities atRisk data. This suggests
that attitudinal reservoirs of discontent differ from aggressive forms
of resistance.
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between minorities and majorities will vary across
countries. For example, several studies of the United
States find that blacks, Latinos, and Asians do not
manifest less state attachment than do whites (Citrin,
Reingold, and Green 1990; de la Garza, Falcon, and
Garcia 1996). This mixed evidence suggests that the
effect of communal group membership is conditional
on group- and state-level attributes.
Following extant literature (e.g., Bollen and
Medrano 1998), we control for age, education, income,
life satisfaction, cosmopolitanism, and whether the re-
spondent is an in-party member. Income and education
are measured in country-specific deciles. Our proxy
for cosmopolitanism is Inglehart’s (1997) familiar mea-
sure of postmaterialism. In-party membership is oper-
ationalized, following Anderson et al. (2005), as a di-
chotomy that captures whether the respondent shared
the party affiliation of the executive, as identified in
Beck et al. (2001).9 Attachment should be negatively
associated with education, income, and postmaterial-
ism; but positively associated with age, life satisfaction,
and in-party status.
Group-Level Factors
We test five hypotheses about how minority group at-
tributes affect state attachment. Our measures derive
from the Minorities-at-Risk dataset. Each group-level
variable is equal to its average over the five years prior
to the WVS survey wave. If there was no data for a
particular group for that five-year period, we used the
prior ten years.
In general, we expect that group attributes that
strengthen group identity will do so at the expense of
their members’ state attachment. First, we consider the
size of a group, operationalized as the group’s propor-
tion of the state’s population. The state attachment of
group members should be weaker in larger groups, be-
cause those groups have the numerical mass to oppose
the state with some effectiveness. Second, we examine
groups’ level of geographic concentration. Groups that
are clustered in a particular region within the country
may find it easier to build internal unity, potentially at
the expense of state attachment. Past studies find that
concentration is positively associated with secession-
ism, protest, and rebellion (Saideman and Ayres 2000;
Saideman et al. 2002; but cf. Cohen 1997). Concentra-
tion may also condition the effect of federalism, as dis-
cussed earlier. Third, groups with a strong identity can
provide an alternative locus of attachment for mem-
bers, who are thus less likely to manifest attachment
to the state. Cohen finds that a measure of strength of
identity (or “group coherence”) is positively related to
some kinds of protest.
Fourth, we measure residency status by coding mi-
nority groups as either “national minorities” or immi-
grants. National minority groups are defined as those
9 In three countries (Singapore, Jordan, and Pakistan) it was not
possible to code in- and out-parties. For these countries, we coded
this dichotomous variable as 0. If we exclude these countries, this
variable’s substantive impact increases slightly.
who have resided in the state prior to state forma-
tion and immigrant groups as those who arrived in the
state at a subsequent point. The former may retain
residual claims to sovereignty and be less attached to
the state (Kymlicka 1996, 120). We differentiate im-
migrant groups according to their length of residency
and expect that those from recent waves should be less
attached to the state than will those from earlier waves.
We created two dichotomous variables—–national mi-
norities and recent immigrants (post-1945, the most
recent category available in the MAR dataset)—–with
earlier immigrants as the excluded category. Both na-
tional minorities and recent immigrants should mani-
fest a lower level of state attachment than will earlier
immigrants.
Fifth, we examine indicators of specific minority
grievances with regard to autonomy, the economy, pol-
itics, and culture. Groups with larger grievances, or a
more defined set of collective interests, should be less
attached to the state. Similar concepts have been shown
to predict group protest and rebellion (Saideman et al.
2002). Autonomy grievances should have the largest
effect, given that groups who desire autonomy are, al-
most by definition, less attached to the state.We do not
have a priori hypotheses about the relative explanatory
power of economic, cultural, and political grievances.
Finally, we measure whether a group is represented
by its own political party—–an attribute that should
condition the effect of proportional electoral systems.
The MAR dataset lists up to three organizations or
parties that represent each group. We then created a
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if at least one of those
organizations is a political party, and 0 otherwise.
Country-Level Factors
At the country level, we control for economic devel-
opment (here,GDP per capita), the (logged) age of the
state itself, the (logged) state’s population, status as a
former Axis power, and status as a former communist
country. The age of state variable addresses Deutsch’s
(1984) estimate that it takes between 300 and 700 years
for ethnic groups to accept and be accepted by the ma-
jority (cited in Bermeo 2002). Population size captures
Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) hypothesis that large states
manifest less pride than do smaller states. Former Axis
powers (specifically, Italy, Germany, and Japan) should
have lower levels of state attachment (see Smith and
Jarkko 1998). The effect of being a former Axis power
will be weaker for minorities than for majorities be-
cause many of the minorities in Germany and Italy
(e.g., Turks in Germany or Roma in Italy) are not di-
rectly implicated in the actions of the Nazi or Fascist
parties. Finally, state attachment should be lower in
postcommunist countries and,moreover, this effectwill
be stronger for minorities thanmajorities. Postcommu-
nist countries have been characterized by difficulties in
creating market economies, democratic political insti-
tutions, and strong civil societies (Howard 2002). Fur-
thermore, the transition from communist rule has often
put minority populations in the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe under particular duress—–for
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example, Russians in Latvia and Estonia (see Chinn
and Truex 1996).
Our emphasis is on the effects of political institutions
on state attachment. We specify hypotheses about the
overall effect of institutions and their particular effects
on the attachment of minorities. The first institutional
condition is the level of democracy. Our hypothesis
is twofold: we expect democracy to exacerbate disaf-
fection with the state in the short run, and to soothe
it in the long run. These effects should hold for both
for majority and minority citizens. We operationalize
democracy with a measure from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall, Jaggers, andGurr 2004),which captures pro-
cedural elements of democracy. To tap short-term ef-
fects, wemeasure the level of democracywith the Polity
IV measure, averaged over the 10 years prior to the
survey. To tap long-term effects, we measure a state’s
accumulated democracy; that is, the sum of a country’s
democracy scores over its life span. This measure is
comparable to something like “years of democracy”
(Anderson et al. 2005), except that it accounts for gra-
dations of democracy,which are potentiallymeaningful
(Elkins 2000).10
The second institution is the proportionality of the
electoral system, which is hypothesized to increase at-
tachment among minorities. Our measure of electoral
proportionality is the median district magnitude of the
country’s lower (or only) legislative chamber. District
magnitude is a useful measure of an electoral system’s
effect on proportionality (see Amorim Neto and Cox
1997; Golder 2003).11 We prefer a measure of the
proportionality of electoral rules to one of electoral
outcomes, such as a seats-to-votes comparison (e.g.,
Gallagher 1991). Measures of proportional outcomes
do not fully capture the discouraging effect that elec-
toral systems can have on party entry in addition to the
vote share itself.
To test the hypothesis that federalism increases at-
tachment, we draw on two measures. The first is a
dummy variable that classifies countries as unitary or
federal, based onwhether local and/or regional govern-
ments have substantial decision-making power. This
measure, of course, masks variation in federal sys-
tems, and some (Rodden 2004; Stepan 1999) argue
against eliding distinct modes of decentralization. Sev-
eral other measures capture variation in political and
fiscal decentralization more completely for at least a
subset of our cases (e.g., Arzaghi and Henderson 2005;
Beck et al. 2001; Lijphart 1999). Probably the most
developed of these indices is Arzaghi and Henderson’s
decentralization index, which summarizes nine dimen-
sions of local autonomy, such as relationships be-
tween central and local governments, constraints on
local power, revenue sharing arrangements, and policy
10 We obtained similar results substituting measures of accumulated
democracy that weighted recent years more heavily than earlier
years, using various exponential decay functions.
11 Our sources for this measure are Golder 2003 and Beck et al.
2001. We take the log of this measure, as we expect that its effect
delivers decreasing returns. Below we report on alternative models
using Gallagher’s (1991) index of proportionality.
jurisdictions. This index is a fairly reliable measure of
the autonomy of local governments.12
MODEL ESTIMATION
To test these hypotheses we estimate a series of hi-
erarchical or multilevel models (see Raudenbusch and
Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Thesemodels
are ideally suited to our data because observations (in
this case, respondents) are “clustered” within higher
level units (both groups and countries). We estimate
models for both pride and identification. Pride is the
four-category scale described previously. For identifi-
cation, we collapse this indicator into a dichotomous
measure where 0 indicates an exclusively ethnic iden-
tification and 1 indicates identification with either an
ethnic group and the state (a dual attachment) or the
state exclusively.13 This dichotomy seems appropriate
because levels of pride were equivalent among those
who had an exclusively state attachment and those who
had a dual attachment to the state and their ethnic
group. For the pride measure, we estimate a hierarchi-
cal linear model. For the dichotomous identification
measure, we estimate a hierarchical generalized linear
model that employs a logit link.14
These dependent variables are then modeled as a
function of two or more of these three levels of data.
For example, the specification of state pride among
minorities is as follows:
Prideijk = π0j + π1R1 + · · · + π7R7 + eijk (1)
π0j = β00 + β01G1 + · · · + β10G10 + r0jk (2)
β00 = γ000 + γ001C1 + · · · + γ008C8 + u00k (3)
R1–R7, G1–G10, and C1–C8 refer to the individual-
(or respondent-), group-, and country-level variables
discussed above. We estimate the individual-level co-
efficients (π1–π7) as fixed, rather than random, across
countries. The individual-level intercept (π0j) is then
modeled as a function of both group- and country-level
effects in equations (2) and (3), respectively. To esti-
mate a cross-level interaction, a group-level coefficient
is modeled as a function of country-level variables.15
12 Because Henderson’s measure is available for only 34 of our 51
countries, we impute missing values for countries using Lijphart’s
federal-unitary scale, the six items in the World Bank fiscal decen-
tralization data, and several items from the Beck et al. (2001) data
on political institutions.
13 We exclude the seven countries where the WVS had no “ethnic
only” category (Brazil, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda, United
States, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe). However, we do include the 19
countries where there was no dual attachment option. Ideally, of
course, we would have equivalent measures in each country. Our
strategy here thus reflects a balance between achieving reasonably
comparable measures and also maximizing the number of countries
included in the analysis.
14 We replicated the models of pride using a hierarchical ordered
probit routine. The results were very similar, so we report the re-
sults of the linear models for ease of interpretation. For the HGLM
models, we report the results of the unit-specific model rather than
the population-averaged model (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002,
303–304). Either model tells the same substantive story.
15 Relaxing the assumption of fixed effects does not change the re-
sults. There are good reasons to presume that these individual-level
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The modeling strategy described thus far makes a
crucial and perhaps unwarranted assumption: that fed-
eralism and electoral proportionality are exogenous
to individual-level attachment. If federalism and pro-
portional electoral systems mitigate disaffection with
the state, they may be more likely to be adopted in
states with significant disaffection. Indeed, the origins
of these systems suggest such a selection pattern (see
Christin andHug 2006). The lack of randomly assigned
institutions could produce simultaneity in the model
and bias estimates of the effects of these institutions.
Given that the institutions tend to be adopted under
adverse conditions for state unity, such selection pat-
terns will likely mute any ameliorative effects of the
institutions.
To mitigate the potential for bias, we pursue an in-
strumental variable approach.We can treat institutions
as exogenous if we can predict the presence of such
institutions with variables that are themselves exoge-
nous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). Because
institutions do in fact arise for observable factors other
than levels of state attachment, such an approach seems
feasible. We developed first-stage equations for both
measures of federalism and for proportional electoral
systems. Each of the equations incorporated a com-
prehensive set of historical and demographic factors as
well as variables to account for policy diffusion (see
the online appendices for specifications, results, and
diagnostic tests). The instruments explain about half
of the variance in the dichotomous indicator of feder-
alism (r2 = 0.59) and in proportional electoral systems
(r2 = 0.39) and satisfy tests of exogeneity. The models
we estimate below incorporate the predicted scores
from these first-stage models as measures of our insti-
tutional variables.16
RESULTS
To establish that there is variance to be explained at
each level of data, one “decomposes” the variance by
estimating amodel in which attachment is a function of
effects might differ across countries, but we are not interested in
accounting for that variation in this analysis, except in that we will
differentiate among minorities-at-risk in subsequent models. A sim-
ilar point holds for variation in the group-level effects (β01–β10). In
modeling the behavior of majorities, we assume that there are no
group-level factors other than those relevant to minorities-at-risk.
This may not be true, if within majorities there are also important
sub-groups whose attributes are relevant to state attachment. Even
assuming that we could specify theoretically who those other sub-
groups are, we lack data on their attributes comparable to the MAR
data.
16 BecauseHLMdoes not include options for instrumental variables,
our analysis is effectively two-stage least squares “by hand” and, as
such, the standard errors need tobe correctedmanually (Achen 1986,
37–50). For the models of pride, we report the corrected standard
errors, which are, once rounded, equivalent to those generated by
HLM. When the outcome variable is dichotomous, as in our models
of identification, corrections to both the coefficients and standard
errors are necessary, but “the standard errors cannot be corrected
simply” (Achen, 49). The corrected coefficients, once rounded, were
the same as the originals. We have not attempted to correct the
standard errors in the identification models, but given the small
differences such corrections have made, we are confident that our
substantive results would remain the same.
only intercepts and error terms (see Steenbergen and
Jones 2002, 227–28). For thepurposes of illustration,we
report such results for the measure of pride. In a model
of pride for all 51 countries, including both minorities
and majorities, 78% of the variance is explained at
the individual level, whereas the remaining 22% is ex-
plained at the country level.Amongmajorities only, the
results are similar (82% and 18%). Among minorities,
65% is explained at the individual level, 22% at the
country level, and 13% at the group level. In each case,
the group and/or country levels account for about one
fifth to one third of the variance, indicating that state
attachment depends on more than just individual-level
characteristics.
Table 2 presents sixmodels: for each dependent vari-
able, we estimate the model described previously for
all respondents, for majorities only, and for minorities
only. All variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. For
the linear models, we present the variance components
and proportion of variance explained for each level
of data. The generalized model does not produce these
statistics for the individual level, only for the group and
country levels (see Luke 2004, 57). These models were
estimated in HLM 6.02 using a restricted maximum
likelihood routine.
Individual-Level Effects
In Table 2, Models 2.1 and 2.4, we analyze the entire
sample with individual- and country-level predictors
for the two dependent variables. In the model of pride
(2.1), the individual-level control variables confirm our
hypotheses: pride is positively associated with life sat-
isfaction, in-party membership, and age, but negatively
associated with education, income, and postmaterial-
ism. In Model 2.4, in which the dependent variable is
identification, only life satisfaction approaches conven-
tional levels of statistical significance. The insignificant
impact of these variables could suggest that the under-
pinnings of identification vary across countries and/or
that these underpinnings involve factors we have not
measured here. Clearly, we know less about what pre-
dicts self-categorization than what predicts pride. The
individual-level control variables have similar effects
across the separate models for majorities and minori-
ties, except for postmaterialism, whose effect on pride
is substantively weak and statistically insignificant for
minorities.
Most importantly, both models confirm the cen-
tral hypothesis: minorities manifest less attachment
than do majorities. In Model 2.1, the substantive ef-
fect (b = −0.09) is comparable to that of life satis-
faction; a hypothetical shift from a nonminority to a
minority is associated with the same change in pride
as a shift from very satisfied to very unsatisfied. In
Model 2.4, the substantive effect corresponds to an
odds ratio of .10, suggesting that minorities are about
ten times less likely to identify with the state than
are majorities. Our findings dovetail with those of
Sidanius et al. (1997) and Dowley and Silver (2000)
in that there are statistically significant differences
between the attachment of minorities and majorities.
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TABLE 2. Multivariate Models of State Attachment
Pride Identification
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
(all) (majority) (MAR) (all) (majority) (MAR)
Individual-level
Minority-at-risk −0.090∗∗∗ — — −2.258∗∗∗ — —
(0.019) (0.384)
In-party member 0.038∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.011 −0.054
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.070) (0.064) (0.199)
Life satisfaction 0.087∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.166+ 0.069 0.131+
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.108) (0.130) (0.082)
Education −0.028∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.018 −0.460 0.091
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.168) (0.413) (0.229)
Income −0.032∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.025∗ −0.028 −0.063 −0.070
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.106) (0.103) (0.167)
Postmaterialism −0.047∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.016 −0.084 −0.092 −0.087
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.212) (0.300) (0.269)
Age 0.122∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.184 −0.227 0.111
(0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.182) (0.397) (0.325)
Group-level
Proportion of population 0.040 1.504∗
(0.067) (0.777)
Group concentration −0.057+ −0.397
(0.036) (0.396)
National minority 0.020 0.510
(0.025) (0.439)
Recent immigrant −0.119∗∗ −0.983+
(0.043) (0.593)
Strength of identity −0.066 0.093
(0.066) (0.672)
Autonomy grievances −0.207∗∗∗ −0.921
(0.054) (0.818)
Political grievances −0.049 −0.015
(0.063) (1.063)
Economic grievances −0.004 −2.155∗∗
(0.079) (0.837)
Cultural grievances −0.016 −0.464
(0.035) (1.079)
Country-level
Level of democracy −0.103∗∗ −0.050+ −0.083+ −0.996 −0.883 −0.113
(0.028) (0.036) (0.058) (0.782) (0.793) (1.117)
Accumulated democracy 0.233∗∗ 0.143+ 0.136 −3.725∗ 0.991 −0.103
(0.077) (0.095) (0.119) (1.600) (2.012) (2.729)
Electoral proportionality (IV) — −0.091∗ −0.211∗ — 1.090 −2.234
(0.042) (0.106) (1.334) (2.039)
Federalism dummy (IV) — 0.018 0.091∗ — −2.549∗∗ −3.508∗∗
(0.033) (0.045) (0.878) (1.192)
Logged population size −0.030 −0.084+ −0.132+ 1.463 2.079+ 3.837∗
(0.053) (0.062) (0.088) (1.291) (1.419) (1.813)
Logged age of state 0.197∗∗ 0.103+ 0.073 −1.352 1.966∗ −1.677
(0.059) (0.068) (0.083) (1.842) (1.073) (2.463)
Former Axis power −0.062∗ −0.054+ −0.024 — — —
(0.030) (0.036) (0.093)
Former communist state −0.121∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 1.108 3.079∗∗ 0.026
(0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (1.080) (0.845) (1.460)
GDP per capita −0.386∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ 3.336∗ 0.008 2.289
(0.056) (0.066) (0.106) (1.957) (1.866) (2.846)
Constant 0.749∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 3.784∗ −0.547 1.794
(0.060) (0.084) (0.012) (1.546) (2.117) (2.768)
Variance components
Individual level 0.043 0.046 .058 — — —
Country level 0.004 0.005 .003 1.557 1.084 1.638
Group level — — .005 — — 0.599
Proportion variance explained
Individual level 0.043 0.027 0.018 — — —
Country level 0.672 0.547 0.835 0.159 0.506 0.554
Group level — — 0.536 — — 0.444
Log-likelihood 10965.3 6667.7 −77.8 −16110.5 −13562.8 −3913.4
N (individuals) 70922 58306 12616 41061 33764 7297
N (countries) 51 51 51 33 33 33
N (groups) — — 90 — — 59
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients from hierarchical linear models (pride) or hierarchical generalized linear models
(identification), with robust standard errors in parentheses. Pride is coded 0-not at all proud to 1-very proud. Identification is coded
0-ethnic only or 1-state only or state and ethnicity. +p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001 (one-tailed).
Source: World Values Survey (1995–1997 and 1999–2001), Minorities-at-Risk dataset, and various country-level data sources.
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Though the substantive magnitude of this difference
rivals or exceeds the effect of other variables, it does
not suggest a yawning chasm between minorities and
majorities.
Group-Level Effects
Although minorities are, on average, less attached
to state than are majorities, this effect varies across
groups, as demonstrated inModels 2.3 and 2.6. It is not
the case that factors that empower minorities necessar-
ily lead to less attachment. Strength of group identity
is not significantly related to either measure of state
attachment.More geographically concentratedminori-
ties express lower pride (b=−0.057), but are not sig-
nificantly less likely to identify with the state. Instead,
identification is more strongly related to the group’s
proportion of the country’s population: larger groups
are more likely to identify with the state. (We also
estimated models that included a measure of absolute
group size rather that its proportion of the population.
It was statistically insignificant in both the models of
pride and identification.)
With respect to a group’s length of residency in the
country, earlier, more established groups tend to ex-
press stronger state attachment. National minorities
were not significantly different from early immigrant
groups (the excluded category in this set of three
dummy variables). This contradicts our expectation
that groups with ties to the land that pre-date the state
would tend to be less attached to the state. However, as
hypothesized, members of more recently immigrated
groups are notably less proud (b=−.119) than are
those who belong to groups who immigrated earlier.
The result is evident with respect to state identification
as well.
The effects of grievances confirmour hypotheses and
what previous research has found for similar constructs
(e.g., Saideman et al. 2002). In the model of pride
(Model 2.3), autonomy grievances matter more than
political, cultural, or economic grievances (and more
than any other group attribute, for that matter). The
substantive effect of autonomy grievances (b=−0.207)
is twice as large as the direct effect of minority sta-
tus in Model 2.1 (b=−0.09). In the model of identi-
fication, economic grievances (though not autonomy
grievances) are significant. Thus, groups that harbor
particular claims against the state manifest lower lev-
els of attachment. In sum, the effects of group-level
factors suggest that the disparate findings about state
attachment among minorities may arise in part be-
cause of group differences, with two factors—–whether
they are recent immigrants and whether they harbor
grievances—–most consequential.
Country-Level Effects
The country-level factors tend to have mixed, and
sometimes opposite, effects on the two dimensions
of attachment, suggesting again that the foundations
of pride and identification may be somewhat differ-
ent.17 As Model 2.1 demonstrates, the level of pride is
lower in the former Axis powers and in former com-
munist countries. (There is no measure of Axis powers
in Model 2.4 because the identification item was not
asked in either Italy or Germany.) The other models
confirmour hypotheses about the conditional effects of
these variables. The dummy variable for Axis powers
has a larger effect on majorities (Model 2.2) than mi-
norities (Model 2.3), confirming our expectation that
minorities are not as “guilt-ridden” over World War
II. By contrast, the dummy variable for former com-
munist countries has a large negative association with
the pride of minorities, one greater than its impact on
that of majorities (the difference between the coeffi-
cients is nearly statistically significant, p= .097, one-
tailed). The effect of this variable on identification is
also much different for majorities than minorities. Ma-
jorities in former communist countries are more likely
to identify with the state (b= 3.079), while minorities
in these countries are no different from minorities
elsewhere (b= 0.026). The difference between these
coefficients is statistically significant (p< .05). Taken
together, these results suggest that the transition from
communism failed to build comparable levels of state
attachment among minorities as among majorities.
Second, the age and size of the state have mixed
effects on state attachment. Age of state has few sig-
nificant effects; if anything, it is positively associated
with the pride and identification of majorities, though
not minorities. The size of the state, measured by
population, has contrasting effects among majorities
and minorities. Models 2.2 and 2.3 show that state
size is associated with lower levels of pride among
both majorities and minorities. At the same time, it
is associated with a greater likelihood of identifying
with the state (Models 2.5 and 2.6), particularly among
minorities.
Third, GDP per capita is negatively associated with
pride, though it has no systematic relationship with
identification in Models 2.4–2.6. Its effects on pride
are statistically significant in the entire sample and in
both majority and minority samples. In Model 2.1 a
shift from GDP’s sample minimum to maximum is as-
sociated with a −0.386 shift in pride. One explanation
for this large effect is that GDP functions much like
education and income do at the individual level. Just
as individuals withmore education and income express
less pride, more economically developed societies ex-
hibit less pride in the aggregate, perhaps because GDP
per capita is a proxy for “cultural” attributes, such as
the level of “cosmopolitan-ness” in a society (see also
Rahn 2005). Regardless of the explanation, economic
17 In Models 2.1–2.6, the inclusion of these several country-level
variables raises concerns about potential multicollinearity. Although
the bivariate correlations among pairs of these variables are never
astronomically high—–the largest correlation, between GDP and ac-
cumulated democracy, is r= .64)—–we estimated a variety of alter-
native specifications to ensure that the results are robust. These
specifications confirm the significant effects documented below and,
most importantly, do not change our inferences about the (non-)
effects of political institutions in particular.
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development does not automatically produce attach-
ment to the state.
Finally, we turn to the institutional variables.Democ-
racy has notable effects, both for the sample as a whole
and for minorities in particular. In Models 2.1 and
2.4, the contemporaneous level of democracy is neg-
atively associated with attachment, though this effect
is statistically significant only for pride. Similar effects
obtain in the separate models of minority and majority
pride, in which the coefficient is always negative and
is significantly associated with pride in particular. In
Model 2.3, a shift from the sample minimum to sample
maximum of the level of democracy is associated with
a −0.083 shift in pride. However, the effect of long-
termaccumulated democracy is different. InModel 2.1,
countries with more accumulated democracy exhibit
higher levels of pride. This effect is evident, though
statistically weaker, among bothmajorities andminori-
ties.Accumulated democracy’s effects on identification
are opposite in sign inModel 2.4, though statistically in-
significant in the models for majorities and minorities.
Thus, democracy’s impact on state attachment depends
somewhat on its duration. Contemporaneous levels of
democracy appear to decrease attachment to the state,
which suggests the potential perils of democratization,
although an accumulated history of democracy tends
to increase attachment as measured by pride. How-
ever, there is no evidence that these effects are partic-
ularly prominent among minorities relative to majori-
ties.Democracy itselfmay not close any “gap” between
majorities andminorities, in either the short or the long
run.
The effects of federalism and electoral proportional-
ity demonstrate that neither institution is consistently
associated with increased minority attachment to the
state. Federalism has a strong negative association with
identification, both among majorities and minorities
(Models 2.5 and 2.6). This effect suggests that federal-
ism may facilitate a substate identity, though it could
take different forms among majorities and minorities.
Despite this rival identity, however, federalism is pos-
itively associated with minorities’ pride in the state
(Model 2.3).18 Federalism appears to encourage both
an alternative identity to the state andpride in the state.
Whether these contrasting effects exact net benefits or
net costs for state unity is an open question.
The proportionality of the electoral system does not
appear to build state attachment among minorities.
In fact, it is negatively associated with pride among
both majorities and minorities. The substantive mag-
nitude of its effect is much larger among minorities
18 In the models for majorities, the alternative measure of
federalism—–the instrumented version of the decentralization index–
generates comparable results, though its effect on attachment is not
statistically significant. In the models for minorities, this measure
has a similar (positive and insignificant) effect on pride, though its
effect on identification (a positive though insignificant coefficient)
is different than the strong negative effect evident in Model 2.6.
Employing noninstrumented versions of these federalism measures
does not change the basic results, although the effects of the non-
instrumented federalism dummy are smaller than those of the in-
strumented version.
(b=−0.211 vs. b=−.091), suggesting a larger gap be-
tween minorities and majorities in proportional sys-
tems. However, the effect of proportionality on iden-
tification is not statistically significant (Models 2.5 and
2.6).19 Although some studies have found that pro-
portionality reduces protest and/or rebellion (Cohen
1997; Saideman et al. 2002), our results do not suggest
similar findings for state attachment (see also Norris
2004).
Thus far, there is little evidence that either federal-
ism or proportional representation ameliorates disaf-
fection with the state, but we have not yet considered
whether group-level attributes condition the apparent
effect of these institutions—–specifically, whether fed-
eralism’s effect depends on the group’s geographical
concentration, andwhether proportionality’s effect de-
pends on the presence of a political party representing
the group. Table 3 presents models identical to those
in Table 2, except they include cross-level interaction
terms that test these conditional hypotheses. (For the
sake of presentation, Table 3 reports only the relevant
coefficients.)
Aswediscussed earlier, the extant literature suggests
no clear interaction between federalism and group con-
centration. This is what we find as well. In Models 3.1
and 3.4, the sign of the coefficient is negative, and
statistically significant at the .10 level in the model
of identification. These results suggest that when im-
posed under conditions of ethnic concentration, feder-
alism is associated with decreased levels of attachment.
However, when we substitute the alternative measure
of federalism in Models 3.2 and 3.5, the coefficients
for the two interaction terms are positive, though not
statistically significant. Thus, the interaction of fed-
eral institutions and group concentration has no clear
effect.
Model 3.3 includes a cross-level interaction between
electoral proportionality and the presence of an eth-
nic party. This interaction term is negatively signed
and statistically significant in both Models 3.3 and 3.6,
suggesting that proportionality tends to weaken state
attachment when an ethnically-based party represents
a particular minority group. When no such party is
present, the effect of proportionality is not statistically
distinguishable from 0.20 This negative effect accords
19 Substituting an instrumented version of Gallagher’s index in the
models of pride produces negative coefficients, though the effect
is statistically significant only for minorities. This measure is also
negatively associated with identification for both majorities and
minorities (p< .10). A noninstrumented version of median district
magnitude has a negative association with pride but no systematic
association with identification. We also eliminated several marginal
democracies—–those whose score on the Polity IV “polcomp” vari-
able was just above the minimum—–and reestimated the models. In
general, we find less evidence that proportional electoral systems
weaken attachment. The upshot, however, of all of these specifica-
tions is that electoral proportionality does not increaseminority state
attachment and, in some specifications, appears to weaken it.
20 Substituting the instrumented Gallagher’s index generates very
similar results for the model of pride, but no significant interaction in
themodel of identification.Whenwe substitute the noninstrumented
measure of median district magnitude, the cross-level interaction is
not significant in either model. Though we prefer the instrumented
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TABLE 3. Models of Minority State Attachment with Cross-Level Interactions
Pride Identification
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6
Cross-level interactions
Federalism dummy (IV) × −0.068 −1.641+
concentration (0.086) (1.224)
Federalism index (IV) × 0.162 0.004
concentration (0.213) (2.631)
Proportionality (IV) × −0.255∗ −4.316∗
ethnic party (0.143) (1.949)
Country level
Electoral proportionality (IV) −0.199∗ −0.184+ −0.074 −2.909+ −3.194 −0.195
(0.110) (0.126) (0.0146) (1.840) (2.529) (2.065)
Federalism dummy (IV) 0.110∗∗ 0.082∗ −2.227∗ −2.950∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.993) (1.117)
Federalism index (IV) −0.022 0.321
(0.124) (1.517)
[others not shown]
Group level
Group concentration −0.032 −0.166 −0.042 −0.232 −0.558 −0.313
(0.042) (0.155) (0.037) (0.521) (2.039) (0.422)
Ethnic party 0.122+ 2.503∗
(0.093) (1.375)
[others not shown]
Individual level [Not shown] [Not shown] [Not shown] [Not shown] [Not shown] [Not shown]
Constant 0.989∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ −0.971∗∗∗ 4.823∗ 8.046∗∗ 2.887
(0.122) (0.127) (0.115) (2.220) (3.112) (2.201)
Variance components
Individual level 0.058 0.058 0.058 — — —
Country level 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.416 0.622 1.009
Group level 0.003 0.003 0.005 1.132 1.196 0.797
Log-likelihood −73.7 −75.9 −74.9 −3913.9 −3916.9 −3912.4
N (individuals) 12616 12616 12616 7297 7297 7297
N (countries) 51 51 51 33 33 33
N (groups) 90 90 90 59 59 59
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients from hierarchical linear models (pride) or hierarchical generalized linear models
(identification), with robust standard errors in parentheses. Pride is coded 0-not at all proud to 1-very proud. Identification is coded
0-ethnic only or 1-state only or state+ethnicity. +p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001 (one-tailed).
Source: World Values Survey (1995–1997 and 1999–2001), Minorities-at-Risk dataset, and various country-level data sources.
with worries that power-sharing in the legislature will
lead to a shift in power of ethnic groups at the expense
of the state. Given that a proportional system enhances
the chances that an ethnic party will gain represen-
tation, it may be that these parties campaign in part
on ethnic issues and thus, explicitly or implicitly, lead
group members to feel less positively about the state.
Thus, proportionality may fail to address disaffection
with the state in these circumstances. If so, this sug-
gests the value of the preferential voting system (Reilly
2001), which can encourage ethnic parties to compete
for votes from citizens outside their ethnic group.
CONCLUSION
States replace their constitutions every 16 years, on
average, and the most ethnically fragmented states do
so about twice as frequently (Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Melton 2007). It is possible that constitutional assem-
blies in these countries will turn to political scientists
measure because of endogeneity concerns, this divergent finding ne-
cessitates cautious inferences about the results in Models 3.3 and
3.6.
for advice about how to construct democratic insti-
tutions that encourage cooperation among competing
groups. One important way to think about this ques-
tion, we argue, is to consider the conditions that shape
citizens’ views of the state—–in particular, whether and
to what extent citizens are willing to express their local
equivalent of “I am an Iraqi” and “I am proud to be
Iraqi.” This sort of state attachment, however wary we
may be of strong in-group attitudes, facilitates unity
in divided societies. What emerges from our analysis
is that states with institutions that facilitate a wider
distribution of power are not those that command the
strongest level of attachment from either theirmajority
population or, perhaps more importantly, from their
minority population.
A broader portrait of state attachment, however,
helps explain why protest and state disintegration are
relatively rare as symptoms of disaffection with the
state. Large majorities of both majority and minor-
ity citizens express attachment to the state. This fact
is often overlooked as dramatic examples of violence
(rightly) command attention, and it deserves emphasis.
However, there is a significant gap between the attach-
ment of majorities and that of minorities. Moreover,
the contours of attachment amongminorities—–defined
705
Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States? November 2007
by weaker attachment among groups that are recent
immigrants and those that have active grievances re-
lated to autonomy and the economy—–suggest that
states must address both “immigrant ethnicity” and
“territorial nationality” (Brubaker 2004).Eachof these
sources of discontent demands a potentially different
response in terms of institutions and policies and is
likely to remain salient for the foreseeable future. Mi-
gration across borders is a fact of life for most devel-
oped andmanydeveloping countries. The desire for au-
tonomy that often characterizes territorial nationality
appears equally durable, as examples such as Chech-
nya suggest. In short, gaps in attachment represent an
ongoing challenge for multiethnic states.
This challenge makes it all the more important to
assess fully the correlates of state attachment and the
consequences of institutional choices. A first important
result is the tenuous relationship between state attach-
ment and economic development, whose role in the
logic of democratization is itself much debated (e.g.,
Przeworski et al. 1999). We find that economic de-
velopment may increase the likelihood of identifying
with the state, but it has a robust negative impact on
pride in the state. This negative effect is evident at the
country level and, analogously, in pride’s relationship
to individual-level education and income: increasing
levels of education andwealth actuallyweaken citizens’
ties to the state, at least to a small degree. Given that
enhancing educational and economic opportunities is
a goal of most developed and developing countries,
this result suggests that attaining this goal may have
adverse unintended consequences.
The most important lesson of our investigation is
that neither democracy nor consociational democratic
institutions have systematic effects on state attach-
ment among minorities. Our findings confirm a para-
dox involving democracy and state attachment. As
much as democracy demands state loyalty, countries
with long histories of democracy are not any more im-
mune from state disaffection thanmore recently estab-
lished democracies. Furthermore, democratizing coun-
tries may be more susceptible to state disaffection, as
transitional periods provide opportunities for citizens
to mobilize based on countervailing identities. This
troubling paradox mirrors our findings with respect
to particular power-sharing institutions. We find no
evidence that either federalism or proportional repre-
sentation encourages minority attachment to the state.
Their effects across both indicators of attachment are
mixed, and their imposition in certain circumstances,
notably when groups are geographical concentrated
or represented by an ethnically-based party, may ac-
tually have negative consequences for the attachment
of minorities. On the whole, our results suggest the
limits of federalism and proportional representation as
remedies in plural societies. Theremaybe good reasons
for adopting such systems, but attachment to the state
will not inevitably result.
Although we have tried to extend the scope of pre-
vious analyses—–by incorporating a larger number of
countries, by incorporating individual-, group-, and
state-level factors, andby investigating factors that con-
dition institutional effects on attachment—–the extraor-
dinarily rich literature on ethnic conflict and democra-
tization requires humility. We view the results above as
a reliable baseline assessment of the conditions asso-
ciated with state attachment in a large set of full and
partial democracies. However, it is important to point
out the limitations in our particular research design,
which both qualify our conclusions and suggest fruitful
avenues for future research. First, our approach to the
question of “divided states” is decidedly atypical. Our
focus is not conflict, bloodshed, or protest, but state
attachment, an attitude whose widespread acceptance
we see as indispensable for democracy in multiethnic
states. We recognize that attachment is not a guaran-
tor of harmony, nor is it exclusively welfare inducing.
A healthy skepticism of the state may be valuable in
some contexts. Nonetheless, acceptance of and loyalty
to the state are crucial to a cooperative environment.
Second, although 51 states and 90 minority groups
constitute a reasonable sample from which to draw
inferences, this sample is far from comprehensive. To
understand the effects of democracy, if not democratic
institutions, on state attachment, we would prefer a
sample more representative of citizens in authoritar-
ian settings. Third, we present here average effects that
derive from pooling groups and countries. These aver-
age effects undoubtedly conceal variation in minority
attachment to the state and in the consequences of
institutions. Understanding such variation will better
illuminate thebenefits and limits of institutional design.
Finally, although our design encompasses a relatively
well-specified set of factors at the individual-, group-,
and country levels, it is in the end a single cross-section.
By instrumenting for some of the institutional choices
in our analysis, we have helped mitigate any inevitable
endogeneity. Nevertheless, repeated cross-sectional or
experimental treatments of this research question are
necessary to corroborate our results.
Our analysis focuses on two institutional solu-
tions that have become focal points in the literature.
However, other approaches to incorporating ethnic
minorities are available to states. For example, there
are “distributive” approaches (seeHorowitz 1985) that
entail the granting of specific resources to minority
groups. Moreover, it may be that effective institu-
tional design involves fairly complex calculations about
the timing and sequence of institutions (see Linz and
Stepan 1992). Clearly, we have not investigated all of
these possibilities, and further research should test the
effect of such practices. The implications are critical to
the performance of participatory democracy.
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